IeB Tabulae
>
Periodica
>
I
>
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
>
IJPR - Recently Published (Springer)
IJPR - Recently Published (Springer)Existential faith and biblical philosophyAbstract In this article, I present a case for a kind of existential theology which would be philosophical and metaphysical, though
not broadly Platonic and classical, and biblical though not illogical. What I present will be an attempt to clarify and justify
what I call “existential hayatological theism”. In so doing I will draw on insights from what Edmond La B Cherbonnier and
Claude Tresmontant designated as “biblical philosophy” and “biblical metaphysics” as well as from the neo-classical philosophies
of Charles Hartshorne and Alfred North Whitehead, especially that of Whitehead.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Nishida Kitarō: Place and Dialectic: Two Essays by Nishida Kitarō Trans. By John W. M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo. Introduction by John W. M. KrummelNishida Kitarō: Place and Dialectic: Two Essays by Nishida Kitarō Trans. By John W. M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo. Introduction by John W. M. Krummel
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Franklin I. Gamwell, Existence and the good: metaphysical necessity in morals and politicsFranklin I. Gamwell, Existence and the good: metaphysical necessity in morals and politics
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] John Finnis, religion and public reasons. Collected essays: volume VJohn Finnis, religion and public reasons. Collected essays: volume V
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] An apology for the “New Atheism”Abstract In recent years, a series of bestselling atheist manifestos by Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Christopher Hitchens has thrust
the topic of the rationality of religion into the public discourse. Christian moderates of an intellectual bent and even some
agnostics and atheists have taken umbrage and lashed back. In this paper I defend the New Atheists against three common charges:
that their critiques of religion commit basic logical fallacies (such as straw man, false dichotomy, or hasty generalization),
that their own atheism is just as “faith-based” as the religious beliefs they criticize, and that their expressed disrespect
for religious belief is immoral.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Editorial prefaceEditorial preface
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Remembering John Hick 1922–2012Remembering John Hick 1922–2012
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Quentin Meillassoux: After finitude: an essay on the necessity of contingency, trans. Ray Brassier. London and New York: Continuum, 2008, 27.95 (hb); 19.95 (pb). Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the making, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, viii and 247 pp. 110.00 (hb); 32.00 (pb).Quentin Meillassoux: After finitude: an essay on the necessity of contingency, trans. Ray Brassier. London and New York: Continuum, 2008, 27.95 (hb);19.95 (pb). Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the making, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, viii and 247 pp. 110.00 (hb);32.00 (pb).
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Helping more than “a little”: recent books on Kierkegaard and philosophy of religionHelping more than “a little”: recent books on Kierkegaard and philosophy of religion
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Erratum to: The lutheran influence on Kant’s depraved willErratum to: The lutheran influence on Kant’s depraved will
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] A secular age? Reflections on Taylor and PanikkarAbstract During the last few years two major volumes have been published, both greatly revised versions of earlier Gifford Lectures:
Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) and Raimon Panikkar’s The Rhythm of Being (2010). The two volumes are similar in some respects and very dissimilar in others. Both thinkers complain about the glaring blemishes
of the modern, especially the contemporary age; both deplore above all a certain deficit of religiosity. The two authors differ,
however, both in the details of their diagnosis and in their proposed remedies. Taylor views the modern age—styled as “secular
age”—as marked by a slide into secular agnosticism, into “exclusive humanism”, and above all into an “immanent frame” excluding
theistic “transcendence”. Although sharing the concern about “loss of meaning”, Panikkar does not find its source in the abandonment
of (mono)theistic transcendence; on the contrary, both radical transcendence and agnostic immanence are responsible for the
deficit of genuine faith. For him, recovery of faith requires an acknowledgment of our being in the world, as part of the
“rhythm of being” happening in a holistic or “cosmotheandric” mode. In classical Indian terminology, while Taylor’s emphasis
on the transcendence-immanence tension reflects ultimately a dualistic perspective (dvaita), Panikkar’s holistic notion of
the rhythm of being captures the core of Advaita Vendanta.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Stefanos Geroulanos: An Atheism That is Not Humanist Emerges in French ThoughtStefanos Geroulanos: An Atheism That is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Wesley Wildman: Religious philosophy as multidisciplinary comparative inquiry: envisioning a future for the philosophy of religionWesley Wildman: Religious philosophy as multidisciplinary comparative inquiry: envisioning a future for the philosophy of religion
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Disagreeing with the (religious) skepticAbstract Some philosophers believe that, when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment equal
weight as her own. Other philosophers worry that this Equal-Weight View is vulnerable to straightforward counterexamples,
and that it requires an unacceptable degree of spinelessness with respect to our most treasured philosophical, political,
and religious beliefs. I think that both of these allegations are false. To show this, I carefully state the Equal-Weight
View, motivate it, describe apparent counterexamples to it, and then explain away the apparent counterexamples. Finally, I
adapt those explanations to cases of religious disagreement. In the end, we reach the surprising conclusion that—even if the
Equal-Weight View is true—in very many cases of religious disagreement between apparent epistemic peers, the parties to the
disagreement need not be conciliatory. And what goes for religious beliefs goes for political and philosophical beliefs as
well. This strongly suggests that the View does not demand an unacceptable degree of spinelessness.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] A puzzle about natural laws and the existence of GodAbstract The existence of natural laws, whether deterministic or indeterministic, and whether exceptionless or ceteris paribus, seems
puzzling because it implies that mindless bits of matter behave in a consistent and co-ordinated way. I explain this puzzle
by showing that a number of attempted solutions fail. The puzzle could be resolved if it were assumed that natural laws are
a manifestation of God’s activity. This argument from natural law to God’s existence differs from its traditional counterparts
in that, whereas the latter seek to explain the fact of natural laws, the former seeks to explain their possibility. The customary objections to the traditional arguments cannot be successfully adapted to counter this new argument, with
one exception which has only limited effect. I rebut four claims that the theistic solution to the puzzle about natural laws
is paradoxical, though I concede that one of these claims has merit. I consider four objections to the new argument but find
three of them more or less unsatisfactory. The fourth, if successful, would undermine our claims to know the truth about the
world.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Divine hiddenness and creaturely resentmentAbstract On Schellenberg’s formulation of the problem of divine hiddenness, a loving God would ensure that anyone capable of having
a relationship with Him, and not resisting it, would be granted sufficient evidence to make belief in God rationally indubitable.
And He would do this by granting a powerful religious experience to every person at the moment he or she reaches the age of
reason. Here I lay out a new reason why God might delay revelation of himself, justifiably allowing for some nonresistant
nonbelief.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] New remarks on the cosmological argumentAbstract We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version
of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such
a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion
which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in
hand, we reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent
with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation
in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ‘cause’ and ‘causality’
are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions
follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused
origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences.
We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by
Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] The deadlock of absolute divine simplicityAbstract In this article, I explain how and why different attempts to defend absolute divine simplicity fail. A proponent of absolute
divine simplicity has to explain why different attributions do not suppose a metaphysical complexity in God but just one superproperty,
why there is no difference between God and His super-property and finally how a absolute simple entity can be the truthmaker
of different intrinsic predications. It does not necessarily lead to a rejection of divine simplicity but it shows that we
may consider another conception of divine simplicity compatible with some metaphysical complexity in God.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] How cool is the philosophy of religion?How cool is the philosophy of religion?
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Editorial prefaceEditorial preface
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Faith in doubt in the endAbstract At one time or another, most Contemporary Continental philosophers of religion make reference to Nietzsche’s announcement
that “God is dead.” However, their interpretation and treatment of that announcement owes nothing to Nietzsche. Instead, they
see the death of God as Hegel did, as a moment in a transition to a new way of talking and thinking about God or the Absolute.
Their faith in God or the Absolute is not in doubt in the end. We argue that if one hears and thinks Nietzsche’s word “God
is dead”—along with Heidegger’s critique of onto-theo-logy-then faith in the end is in doubt. Any affirmation or profession
of faith is questionable; there is no promise that all conflicts will be resolved and that all will be saved and forgiven.
Nietzsche’s saying that “God is dead” calls for thinking and questioning; it calls not for faith, but faith in doubt.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Secularity and biblical literalism: confronting the case for epistemological diversityAbstract Stephen Carter argues that biblical literalism is predicated on an epistemological position drastically different than that
maintained by mainstream scientists inasmuch as it operates on the basis of a “hermeneutic of inerrancy” with respect to the
ideas laid out in the Bible. By relying on considerations offered by Charles Taylor and recent sociological studies, I contend
that Carter’s thesis is incorrect. The divide between proponents and opponents of biblical literalism is ethical rather than
epistemological. Beyond the philosophical implications of my contention, this displays that deliberative engagement between
these parties—which depends on shared epistemological norms—is possible in principle.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] The lutheran influence on Kant’s depraved willAbstract Contemporary Kant-scholarship has a tendency to allign Kant’s understanding of depravity closer to Erasmus than Luther in
their famous debate on the freedom of the will (1520–1527). While, at face value, some paragraphs do warrant such a claim,
I will argue that Kant’s understanding of the radical evil will draws closer to Luther than Erasmus in a number of elements.
These elements are (1) the intervention of the Wille for progress towards the good, (2) a positive choice for evil, (3) the
inscrutability of moral progress, (4) the rejection of prudence as a means for salvation and (5) the rejection of moral sentimentalism.
I believe that Kant-scholarship mistakenly pegs Kant’s rational Enlightenment optimism for an existential optimism while Kant’s
view of fallen nature draws closer to Lutheran than Erasmusian depravity. A tacit Lutheran influence pervades Kant’s moral
philosophy which could explain the influence Kant’s has had on some more pessimistic 19th century philosophers such as Arthur
Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Recent books on neo-confucian philosophy of religionRecent books on neo-confucian philosophy of religion
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Rethinking fideism through the lens of Wittgenstein’s engineering outlookAbstract Careful readers of Wittgenstein tend to overlook the significance his engineering education had for his philosophy; this despite
Georg von Wright’s stern admonition that “the two most important facts to remember about Wittgenstein were, firstly, that
he was Viennese, and, secondly, that he was an engineer.” Such oversight is particularly tempting for those of us who come
to philosophy late, having first been schooled in math and science, because our education tricks us into thinking we understand
engineering by extension. But we do not. I will illustrate this common tendency to misread Wittgenstein by examining three
engineering concepts that have little significance for science but played important roles in Wittgenstein’s philosophical
thinking. These are: method of projection, dynamical similarity, and satisfactoriness. The upshot of this analysis will be
a strong challenge to the myth of his putative fideism because neither fideism nor its contrary simply would have occurred
to Wittgensteinthe-engineer.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] God, free will, and time: the free will offense part IIGod, free will, and time: the free will offense part II
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Editorial prefaceEditorial preface
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Megill’s multiverse meta-argumentAbstract In a recent paper in this journal, Jason Megill (2011) offers an innovative meta-argument which deploys considerations about multiple universes in an effort to block all arguments
from evil. In what follows, I contend that Megill has failed to establish a key premise in his meta-argument. I also offer
a rival account of the effect of multiverse models on the debate about evil.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] A cure for worry? Kierkegaardian faith and the insecurity of human existenceAbstract In his discourses on ‘the lily of the field and the bird of the air,’ Kierkegaard presents faith as the best possible response
to our precarious and uncertain condition, and as the ideal way to cope with the insecurities and concerns that his readers
will recognize as common features of human existence. Reading these discourses together, we are introduced to the portrait
of a potential believer who, like the ‘divinely appointed teachers’—the lily and the bird—succeeds in leading a life that
is full of care, but free of worry. Such a portrait, we claim, echoes Kierkegaard’s portrait of the knight of faith in Fear and Trembling. In this essay we suggest that faith, as characterized in the ‘lily and bird’ discourses, is a kind of existential trust
that would allow us to overcome worry, while remaining wholeheartedly engaged in the finite realm of our cares and concerns.
We claim that Kierkegaard’s goal in these discourses is not to belittle our earthly cares, but to invite us to develop a modified
attitude toward all that we are susceptible to worry about.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] On the number of godsAbstract A god is a cosmic designer-creator. Atheism says the number of gods is 0. But it is hard to defeat the minimal thesis that
some possible universe is actualized by some possible god. Monotheists say the number of gods is 1. Yet no degree of perfection
can be coherently assigned to any unique god. Lewis says the number of gods is at least the second beth number. Yet polytheists
cannot defend an arbitrary plural number of gods. An alternative is that, for every ordinal, there is a god whose perfection
is proportional to it. The n-th god actualizes the best universe(s) in the n-th level of an axiological hierarchy of possible universes. Despite its unorthodoxy, ordinal polytheism has many metaphysically
attractive features and merits more serious study.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] St. Thomas Aquinas on punishing soulsAbstract The details of St. Thomas Aquinas’s anthropological view are subject to debate. Some philosophers believe he held that human
persons survive their deaths. Other philosophers think he held that human persons cease to exist at their death, but come
back into being at the general resurrection. In this paper, I defend the latter view against one of the most significant objections
it faces, namely, that it entails that God punishes and rewards separated souls for the sins or merits of something else:
the (non-existent) persons to whom those souls once belonged. The objector takes this entailment to be problematic. I argue
that it fits in well with St. Thomas’s views about punishment and about persons.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Eleonore Stump: Wandering in darkness: narrative and the problem of sufferingEleonore Stump: Wandering in darkness: narrative and the problem of suffering
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Robert Cummings Neville: Realism in religion: a pragmatist’s perspectiveRobert Cummings Neville: Realism in religion: a pragmatist’s perspective
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Editorial preface vol. 70.2Editorial preface vol. 70.2
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Are skeptical theists really skeptics? Sometimes yes and sometimes noAbstract Skeptical theism is the view that God exists but, given our cognitive limitations, the fact that we cannot see a compensating
good for some instance of evil is not a reason to think that there is no such good. Hence, we are not justified in concluding
that any actual instance of evil is gratuitous, thus undercutting the evidential argument from evil for atheism. This paper
focuses on the epistemic role of context and contrast classes to advance the debate over skeptical theism in two ways. First,
considerations of context and contrast can be invoked to offer a novel defense of skeptical theism. Second, considerations
of context and contrast can be invoked to undermine the two most serious objections to skeptical theism: the global skepticism
objection and the moral objection. The gist of the paper is to defend a connection between context and contrast-driven views
in epistemology with skeptical views in philosophy of religion.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] God, ignorance and existenceGod, ignorance and existence
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Divine determinism, human freedom, and the consequence argumentAbstract In this paper I consider the view, held by some Thomistic thinkers, that divine determinism is compatible with human freedom,
even though natural determinism is not. After examining the purported differences between divine and natural determinism,
I discuss the Consequence Argument, which has been put forward to establish the incompatibility of natural determinism and
human freedom. The Consequence Argument, I note, hinges on the premise that an action ultimately determined by factors outside
of the actor’s control is not free. Since, I argue, divine determinism also entails that human actions are ultimately determined
by factors outside of the actors’ control, I suggest that a parallel argument to the Consequence Argument can be constructed
for the incompatibility of divine determinism and human freedom. I conclude that those who reject natural compatibilism on
the basis of the Consequence Argument should also reject divine compatibilism.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Science and religion todayScience and religion today
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Omniscience and worthiness of worshipAbstract At first glance, the properties being omniscient and being worthy of worship might appear to be perfectly co-instantiable. (To say that some properties are co-instantiable is just to say that it is possible that some object instantiate all of them simultaneously. Being entirely red and being a ball are co-instantiable; being entirely red and being entirely blue are not). But there are reasons to be worried about this co-instantiability, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments
with respect to certain kinds of knowledge and notions of personhood, it might be the case that no being—God included—could
instantiate both. In this paper, I lay out and motivate this claim before going on to consider a variety of responses—some
more plausible than others—that may be offered by the theist.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Rorty, religion, and humanismAbstract This article offers a review of Richard Rorty’s attempts to come to terms with the role of religion in our public and intellectual
life by tracing the key developments in his position, partially in response to the ubiquitous criticisms of his distinction
between private and public projects. Since Rorty rejects the possibility of dismissing religion on purely epistemic grounds,
he is determined to treat it, instead, as a matter of politics. My suggestion is that, in this respect, Rorty’s position is
best construed as that of a humanist rather than a post-modernist. Ultimately, it appears that, in his view, the positive
element of religion—i.e. the idea of religion as a social gospel—has been absorbed and transformed into a utopian striving
which humanists associate with the ideal of democracy. Hence, in this regard, religion can be considered obsolete. Yet, without
explicitly invoking the usual epistemic grounds, Rorty’s arguments for excluding religion from the public sphere remain rather
thin, and an interest in reforming rather than excluding religion would have been more consistent with his general outlook.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Pierre Bouretz, Witnesses for the future: philosophy and messianism. Translated by Michael B. SmithPierre Bouretz, Witnesses for the future: philosophy and messianism. Translated by Michael B. Smith
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Jürgen Habermas: Between naturalism and religion. Translated by Ciaran CroninJürgen Habermas: Between naturalism and religion. Translated by Ciaran Cronin
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Book reviewsBook reviews
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Thomas Nagel, Secular philosophy and the religious temperament: essays 2002–2008Thomas Nagel, Secular philosophy and the religious temperament: essays 2002–2008
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Editorial prefaceEditorial preface
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Book reviewsBook reviews
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Keeping score: the consequential critique of religionAbstract This essay attempts to specify just what one would need to show in order to draw any substantive conclusion about religion’s
consequential value. It is focused on three central questions: (1) What exactly is being evaluated? (2) What benefits and
harms are relevant? (3) How are the relevant benefits and harms to be assessed? Each of these questions gives rise to a range
of thorny philosophical and empirical issues, and any thesis about religion’s ultimate consequential value will therefore
be contingent on a range of rationally contestable assumptions and stipulations. Consequently, one should not take it as “obvious”
that religion is a harmful social force, or that the world would be better off without it. Such claims require much more empirical
research and philosophical reflection than they have received thus far. Thus, while we can point to a few clear cases of religiously-produced
harm and benefit, we do not yet know what religion’s ultimate consequential value is, as counter-intuitive as that may seem.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Thaddeus J. Kozinski: The political problem of religious pluralism: and why philosophers can’t solve itThaddeus J. Kozinski: The political problem of religious pluralism: and why philosophers can’t solve it
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Editorial PrefaceEditorial Preface
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] Grim’s arguments against omniscience and indefinite extensibilityAbstract Patrick Grim has put forward a set theoretical argument purporting to prove that omniscience is an inconsistent concept and
a model theoretical argument for the claim that we cannot even consistently define omniscience. The former relies on the fact
that the class of all truths seems to be an inconsistent multiplicity (or a proper class, a class that is not a set); the
latter is based on the difficulty of quantifying over classes that are not sets. We first address the set theoretical argument
and make explicit some ways in which it depends on mathematical Platonism. Then we sketch a non Platonistic account of inconsistent
multiplicities, based on the notion of indefinite extensibility, and show how Grim’s set theoretical argument could fail to
be conclusive in such a context. Finally, we confront Grim’s model theoretical argument suggesting a way to define a being
as omniscient without quantifying over any inconsistent multiplicity.
view article | [International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Browse Results)] |
