This article is intended to investigate how the concept of the Way (dao) is applied in the Analects of Confucius both as a universal norm and as a practical application in association with other concepts, virtue (de) on the one hand, and ability or skill (neng) or method (fang) on the other. Through a synthetic reconstruction of these concepts, it will come to the conclusion that the Way, virtue, and practical skills are the three central and mutually interpreted themes in the ethical discourse as presented in the Analects.

This article discusses Confucius's view of courage in comparison with Aristotle's and Neo-Confucians'. It proposes the following arguments: (i) Confucius's conception of courage is much broader than Aristotle's, since it does not confine courage to the category of martial virtue and moral excellence that presupposes a noble motive; (ii) both Confucius's and Aristotle's conceptions of courage hold that courage is concerned with the fear of external threats but not the strength in self-improvement as Neo-Confucians have proposed; and (iii) Confucius's conception of courage is more relevant and significant than Aristotle's and Neo-Confucians' to contemporary life.

This article examines the origins of and philosophical justifications for Aristotelian friendship (philia) and early Confucian filial piety (xiao). What underlying assumptions about bonds between friends and family members do the philosophies share or uniquely possess? Is the Aristotelian emphasis on relationships between equals incompatible with the Confucian regard for filiality? As I argue, the Aristotelian and early Confucian accounts, while different in focus, share many of the same tensions in the attempt to balance hierarchical and familial associations with those between friends who are on the same footing.

In this sequel of my previous publication, I will continue my discussion of the word tian as it appears in the Guodian texts. I shall argue that, from natural order arises xing, human's distinctive potentiality, which is endowed by heaven to follow and be guided by the heavenly principle. I thereafter will elaborate the sages' role as cultural creators. The distinct roles of heaven and humanity are further deepened when tian and ming are perceived as the determinants of an individual's success or failure. I will go on to show how the word tian can be understood as the source or underlying pattern that brings about coincidental or synchronous events and experiences.

Ren in the Lunyu is often taken to be virtue; if virtue is taken to be excellence as performing a function, as Plato understands it, this is not persuasive. Nor is it easy to show how ren encompasses or implies all other virtues. Ren is furthermore ambiguous—it is used both in a wide sense and specifically as benevolence; in fact there are at least six accounts of what ren is in the Lunyu. This ambiguity cannot be made harmless by use of speech act theory, since commands, for example, require satisfaction conditions for them to be comprehensible. I conclude on a skeptical note: how ren is to be understood as virtue, if at all, remains unclear.

Based on publications addressing post-secularity in international contexts, this article identifies four basic interpretive positions manifest within our post-secular age: resistant post-secular secularists, strategic post-secular secularists, engaged post-secular intellectuals, and engaged post-secular religious intellectuals. Subsequently, an article addressing governance and religious studies in mainland China published by Zhuo Xinping in 2010 is assessed, indicating how Zhuo serves as an engaged post-secular intellectual position, charging Chinese Marxist officials to adopt a strategic post-secular secularist position. Finally, it is shown how in a major volume on philosophical studies in China published in 2008 by Li Jingyuan a strategic post-secularist position is manifest.

The article argues in the first part that the Lunyu is the only early text in which Confucius is not depicted as the ultimate sage authority who knows an answer to all questions. Instead the Confucius of the Lunyu leaves questions open and points out limits of possible knowledge. The second part of the article shows that in the exegesis of the Gongyang Zhuan we find exactly the same attitudes of Confucius. The article argues in the third part that the specific character of the Lunyu construction of Confucius lies in its ascribing to him professional attitudes found in the realm of historiography and ritual expertise.

Foucault and Zhuangzi share important insights on the role of knowledge practices play in the pursuit of human freedom. This article investigates Foucault's discussion of the subjectivation truth games of the ancient Greeks and Romans, and in light of the discussion, reconsiders Zhuangzi's approach to knowledge practices. It also examines the notion of self and freedom embedded in the knowledge practices of Foucault and Zhuangzi and suggests that, when trying to get away from the metaphysical subject, there is an inherent problem associated with Foucault's embrace of the Western notion of freedom as autonomy. The conclusion suggests that Zhuangzi's notion of freedom as breaking through our limits and entering into the larger whole; his notion of the self as non-being may make the human pursuit of freedom more successful.

Confucius must have inspired his disciples to identify the process and structure of the human self and required self-cultivation in embodying and developing virtues within and practicing virtues as potential ways for its full self-realization. My discussion will be carried out through a conceptual and onto-hermeneutic analysis of the underlying self (ji) structure and its born nature and mind as content as deliberated in the Lunyu (the Analects). On the basis of this approach we will come to see how a moral psychology of virtues is founded and how such a moral psychology has implications for moral onto-generative metaphysics and onto-generative ethics.